Beck's cognitive model of depression proposes that certain types of negative interpretation of experience (depressive cognitions) can produce symptoms of depression (Beck et al. 1979) . In this paper I shall examine a number of aspects of this hypothesis. First, I shall consider the evidence that negative thinking is an important factor maintaining the depressed state. Second, I shall present evidence which suggests that negative thinking produces depression, and that depressed mood biases thinking in a negative direction. I shall suggest that this reciprocal relationship between negative thinking and depression can in certain circumstances form the basis of a vicious circle which can act to intensify or maintain the depressed state. I shall conclude by discussing the implications of this vicious circle for vulnerability to depression; maintenance of depression; and treatment of depression.
Do negative interpretations of experience maintain depression?
Beck has suggested that certain types of negative interpretation of experience, particularly those involving losses and disappointments, can produce symptoms of depression (Beck et al. 1979) . He suggested that three types of negative cognition relating to negative views of the self, the world and the future, were particularly important in this respect.
Beck proposed that such negative cognitions could play an important part in the onset and maintenance of depression. It is obviously easier, both practically and ethically, to investigate the role of negative thinking in the maintenance of the condition, so I shall concentrate on the evidence relevant to this issue. To support the proposed role of negative thinking it is necessary to demonstrate: (1) an increased frequency or intensity of negative cognitions in depressed patients that covaries with their level of depression; (2) that symptoms of depression are intensified when subjects experience negative cognitions; and (3) that reducing negative thinking in depressed patients leads to alleviation of their symptoms of depression. I shall not dwell on the first two of these issues; there is ample evidence, both from clinical experience and from more systematic investigations, that depressed patients report increased negative depressive thinking. Further, clinical observation and some experimental evidence (e.g. Teasdale & Bancroft 1977) support the proposal that negative interpretations of experience can increase depression levels. I shall concentrate on the third issue: does reducing negative thinking alleviate depression? This is at once the most important test of Beck's idea that negative thinking is normally an important factor maintaining clinical depression, and also the issue with the most obvious therapeutic implications.
There have actually been very few investigations of this central prediction of Beck's theory. The apparent effectiveness of cognitive therapy for depression, a treatment primarily aimed at reducing the negative thinking of depressed patients (Beck et al. 1979) , cannot be given much weight as evidence on this issue. This is because cognitive therapy is a complex treatment which includes many elements other than those aimed directly at modifying depressive thinking. It may be these elements rather than any effect on negative thoughts that are responsible for the success of this treatment. For this reason, it is necessary to look to more carefully controlled experimental investigations. There are unfortunately few of these. I shall describe two of the studies which have been conducted in this area. In both the aim was to study, in depressed patients, the immediate effects on depression of brief interventions aimed at changing depressive thinking (Teasdale & Fennell 1983) .
The first study (Fennell & Teasdale 1983 ) was conducted on a group of depressed inpatients and day-patients. For each patient, the immediate effects on depression of a distraction procedure were compared with the effects of simply sitting staring at a blank wall without attempting to divert attention from depressing negative thoughts. The aim of the distraction procedure was to reduce the frequency of negative thoughts by making patients concentrate on describing what they could see in a series of slides projected on to the wall. It was found that among patients scoring towards the neurotic end of the Newcastle Diagnosis Scale (Carney et al. 1965) , distraction was effective in reducing the frequency of negative thoughts to approximately half that observed when patients just sat looking at the wall. This manipulation of thinking had the predicted effect on measures of depressed mood: when the distraction of the ongoing interchange with the experimenter was removed and patients were left alone with their thoughts, mood deteriorated. By contrast, when the distraction inherent in interacting in the experiment was intensified even further by looking at slides, mood improved. Similar effects were obtained on two psychomotor measures of depression, speech rate and writing speed. In both cases, patients showed reduced psychomotor slowing after distraction, but increased psychomotor slowing after just sitting, staring at the wall. This study clearly demonstrated that manipulating the frequency of the depressing thoughts experienced by patients led to appreciable changes in their state of depression, at least in the short term. As well as confirming the prediction from the cognitive model, this study also has obvious implications for the management of depressed patients; it is clearly important that they are occupied rather than left to ruminate on their depressing thoughts.
The aim of the second study (Teasdale & Fennell 1982) was not to change the frequency of negative thoughts but rather to change belief in them. First, we identified with the patient a negative thought which seemed to be on their mind and therefore contributing to their depression at the time the experiment took place. An attempt was then made-either to change the belief in the thought, or an equivalent amount of time was spent getting more information on the background of the thought, showing empathy and being reflective and exploring further aspects of the situation. In this way, the specific effects which thoughtchange procedures had over and above the more general effects of receiving therapeutic attention could be examined.
The prediction from Beck's cognitive model is clearly that if belief in the negative thoughts could be modified, this would produce a greater reduction in patients' depression than if the same time was spent relating to patients without attempting to modify belief. The experiment was based on only a small number of patients but the results were clear. In every patient there was a considerable reduction in belief in the negative thought when this was the aim of the intervention, whereas when time was simply spent showing empathy and being reflective and exploratory there was very little shift in belief. In every patient the greater reduction in belief in the active thought-change condition led to a greater reduction in depressed mood. Again, the evidence was consistent with the prediction from the cognitive theory of depression that modifying depressive thoughts alleviates depression. As well as confirming that prediction, these results (Teasdale & Fennell 1982) suggest that it may not be enough to spend time with depressed patients talking with them about their problems in an understanding and sympathetic manner. Rather, it seems important to spend the time in a way that will lead to change in the negative thoughts that maintain depression. These conclusions obviously depend on the assumption that we can generalize from the studies of immediate effects of brief interventions to more long-term effects. However, within their limitations, these results are consistent with the central prediction of Beck's model and also provide support for the rationale of cognitive therapy.
Does depressed mood increase negative interpretations of experience?
Having briefly discussed the effects of thinking on depression, let us now consider the effects of depression on thinking. Psychiatric tradition has long maintained that the negative thinking shown by depressed patients is in some way the result of depression biasing the thinking processes of the depressed person. We and other workers have now completed a considerable number of experiments which have sought to examine whether depressed mood does indeed bias thinking in a negative direction. Specifically, these experiments have examined the question 'Does depressed mood increase the accessibility of negative thoughts and memories and decrease the accessibility of positive thoughts and memories?' That is, when we are in depressed mood, are negative thoughts, interpretations of experience, or past memories simply easier to get hold of and more likely to come to mind than when we are in a normal mood state, and is the converse true for positive memories? A large number of experiments suggest that the answer to both these questions is 'Yes'.
It has been demonstrated, both in studies of experimentally produced moods in normal subjects and in studies of natural variation in the mood of depressed patients, that there is a very potent effect of mood state on the accessibility of positive and negative cognitions (Clark & Teasdale 1982 , Teasdale 1983a , Teasdale & Fogarty 1979 , Teasdale & Russell 1983 , Teasdale & Taylor 1981 , Teasdale et al. 1980 ). This can be illustrated by briefly describing the results of three studies. Teasdale & Taylor (1981) conducted a study in which normal student volunteers were experimentally put either into a depressed mood or into an elated mood. They were then asked to recall memories of previous life experiences associated in some way with neutral cue words. The memories were noted and subsequently, in normal mood state, subjects rated how pleasant or unpleasant the original experiences had been. It was found that, compared to elated mood, depressed mood both decreased the probability of retrieving happy memories and increased the probability of retrieving unhappy memories. In a subsequent study (Clark & Teasdale 1982 ) using essentially the same design but without manipulating the mood of normal subjects, the effects of natural diurnal variation in the mood of depressed patients were examined. Each patient was seen on two occasions, once during the most depressed phase of their diurnal cycle, and once during the least depressed phase. These natural variations in mood had similar effects on accessibility to those observed in the previous study (Teasdale & Taylor 1981) : when patients were more depressed they were more likely to retrieve memories of unhappy experiences and less likely to retrieve memories of happy experiences than when they were less depressed.
These effects of mood on accessibility are now well established both within our own work and that of others (e.g. Bower 1981). Their importance does not lie entirely in the effects that mood state has on the types of memory that come to mind. These effects on accessibility will also have a very potent influence on the interpretations that are made of ongoing experience, because these will be determined jointly by the nature of the experiences and by the nature of the concepts that are most accessible to interpret them. The findings for the effects of mood on accessibility suggest that once in a depressed mood state, subjects are much more likely to interpret their experience negatively. A study recently completed by Atmane Ikhlef (1982) provides a neat demonstration of this. Student subjects attempted a series of problems. Half were given feedback indicating that they had succeeded, and the remainder were given feedback indicating that they had failed. Half of each group were then put into a depressed mood and half into an elated mood. All subjects were then asked to make ratings for their attributions for success or failure on the experimental task. This included a rating of the extent to which the subjects saw their success or failure as resulting from their own ability or, in the case of failure, lack of it. When subjects tried to account in depressed mood for their previous failure, they blamed their own lack of ability (or stupidity) much more than if they made attributions in elated mood. Conversely, among the subjects who succeeded, those making attributions in depressed mood were less likely to attribute this to their own ability than subjects making the same rating in elated mood. In other words, the induction of depressed mood changed the way in which subjects interpreted their previous experiences so that they took more blame for failure and less credit for success.
From studies such as these it is clear that depressed mood biases the processing of information so that, once in depressed mood, people are more likely to interpret their experience in a way that will keep them depressed, or indeed intensify their depression. In this way the depressed person can get trapped in a vicious circle of the kind illustrated in Figure 1 . This suggests that as well as certain negative interpretations of experience producing depression, depression, through its effect on accessibility, will lead to further negative interpretations of ongoing experience, keeping the person depressed.
Vulnerability to depression
The nature of the vicious circle illustrated in Figure 1 may be of considerable importance in determining whether an initial depressed mood (resulting either from a life event involving loss or disappointment or from a mood fluctuation of more endogeneous origin) proceeds through a normal course of. spontaneous recovery or becomes more intense and prolonged.
In discussing the factors that may lead to revolution of this circle we must obviously also answer the question of why, given such a vicious circle based on a reciprocal relationship between depression and cognition, everyone is not depressed all the time.
I suggest that, in addition to any more biological factors that may be operating, the following psychosocial factors are of great importance in determining whether the circle we are considering revolves in a vicious or benevolent direction: (1) the nature of the environmental input, both as created by the person's own activity and as determined by others around him; (2) the nature of the cognitions (memories, interpretations) that become accessible -in depressed mood; (3) the person's knowledge of the nature of depression and his knowledge and practice of coping behaviours. Each of these is a huge area and each class of factors interacts with the others; they will be discussed here only briefly.
It is important to remember that while Beck's approach to affective disorders has been termed cognitive, it stresses as centrally important the interpretation or conscious meaning of experience. The meaning or interpretation a person attaches to his experience will be determined by the nature of the interpretive concepts and schemata accessible to him but also, most importantly, by the nature of'the experience itself. In other words, the kind of experiences the person has when mildly depressed are likely to be important influences determining whether or not further depressive cognitions will occur and perpetuate the depression. The work of Brown & Harris (1978) is of obvious relevance here. They found that life events and difficulties increased women's risk of becoming clinically depressed, but only in the presence of one or more of the following vulnerability factors: lack of an intimate confiding relationship with husband or boyfriend; three or more young children at home; lack of paid employment; loss of mother before age 11. These factors did not increase the risk of becoming depressed in the absence of a life event or difficulty. Brown & Harris (1978) also found that chronic"depression was associated with long-term environmental stressors, such as poor housing or marital difficulties, which are likely to provide a continuing source of experiences open to negative interpretation, particularly when processed through the negatively-biased cognitive system of the person who is already mildly depressed. Less dramatic environmental influences could also be of considerable importance. Brown & Harris' (1978) vulnerability factors may operate by determining whether -an initially mild depressive reaction, of the type that most people are likely to experience in the face of negative life events, becomes more persistent and intense, or dissipates. For example, the irritability and loss of interest and affection that are symptomatic of depression may be more likely to lead to thoughts such as 'I am a failure as a wife' when they occur in the context of a non-intimate relationship with a spouse than in the context of an intimate relationship. This could be both because the non-intimate relationship does not provide positive experiences that would weigh against the conclusion 'I am a failure as a wife', and also because such a relationship may provide negative experiences that will reinforce the negative interpretation: for example, critical comments and lack of sympathy or support. Talking problems over with a confiding spouse may also provide an opportunity for testing out and correcting the overly negative interpretations that result from the effects of depression on thinking; the spouse is likely to be in a less depressed mood and so, in a confiding relationship, can suggest more realistic alternative interpretations to those that are worrying his wife. In this way the vicious circle may be short-circuited.
Similarly, another of Brown & Harris' (1978) vulnerability factors, presence of many young children at home, is highly likely to produce recurrent problems such as difficulties in discipline or control, disagreements and irritability. Once a mother is in a mildly depressed mood, such environmental input might well, as a result of mood effects on accessibility, lead -to negative interpretations relating to inadequacy as a mother or hopelessness of change.
As well as providing positive or negative experiences that may affect the extent to which people think negatively about themselves, their world, or their future, environments may also be of great importance in determining whether, rather than how, people think about themselves and their life. The experiment on the effects of distraction (Fennell & Teasdale 1983) suggests that if attention is demanded by an external task, which largely occupies one's information processing capacity, then there may be little capacity left to dwell on the issues that might generate negative thoughts. Work may well have its effects in protecting against becoming depressed in this way; the person who has to concentrate on the externally-generated demands of a job will have less opportunity to ruminate than the selfpaced housewife engaged in routine chores.
I have considered experience first because there is a danger that in concentrating on cognitive interpretive factors in depression we may forget that a very important factor determining the interpretation of experience is the nature of experience itself. It is clear, however, that there is considerable scope for differences between individuals in their interpretation of the same experience. Depressed mood increases the availability of negative memories and interpretative concepts, so that negative interpretations of experience are more likely in depressed mood than in non-depressed mood. Our findings from manipulating mood in normal subjects suggest that this effect of mood is true of most people. However, there are likely to be differences between individuals in the particular types of negative memories and interpretative concepts that become accessible in mildly depressed mood, and some of these may be more likely than others to lead to the types of negative interpretation that will perpetuate depression. For example, activation of concepts such as 'worthless', 'stupid', 'hopeless' and 'failure' in mildly depressed mood is likely to lead to more depressing interpretations than activation of milder concepts such as 'thoughtless' or 'silly'.
The reason for expecting differences between individuals in the concepts activated in depressed mood is that our best understanding of this phenomenon suggests that the concepts which become activated and accessible in current depressed mood will be those which have previously been activated in association with depressed mood in the person's life experience (Teasdale 1983a,b) . Individuals are likely to differ considerably in this respect. For example, a person who as a child has been repeatedly told that they are 'stupid' or 'no good' by harshly critical parents and often felt sad and rejected, is much more likely, as an adult, to have depressogenic self-devaluative concepts activated in mildly depressed mood than someone from a more benign home environment. Differences between individuals in the concepts that become activated in mildly depressed mood may be an important factor determining whether or not an initially mild depressive mood becomes more persistent or severe, and in this way may represent an important dimension of cognitive vulnerability to depression (Teasdale 1983b) . It is interesting in this respect that a recent longitudinal prospective study by Lewinsohn et al. (1981) found that persistence of depression could be predicted from measures of negative thinking taken once subjects were depressed, although measures taken in the non-depressed state bore no relation to the risk of becoming depressed. This relationship could not be accounted for simply by differences in severity of depression.
Differences in the effects of depressed mood on thinking are just beginning to be explored, and it is of some interest, given the sex difference in prevalence of depression, that in a recent study the effects of induced mood on the accessibility of words related to selfevaluative concepts were found to be much more pronounced in women than in men (Clark & Teasdale 1983, in preparation) .
The third set of factors concerns the extent to which a person has knowledge of the nature of depression, and knowledge and skill in coping with depression. Our clinical impression, based on patients with major depressive disorder, is that negative interpretations of the symptoms of depression itself often seem to be an important factor maintaining the condition. The extent to which a person regards the effects of depression as evidence of personal inadequacy, rather than features of a psychological state for which they are not to be blamed, will clearly be determined jointly by their knowledge of the nature of depression and by the accessibility of alternative self-devaluative interpretations (such as laziness, selfishness), as affected by their mood state. Our impression is that many of these patients have a limited knowledge of depression and its effects. One of the most helpful features of cognitive therapy appears to be the provision of information and advice which enables the patient to distance himself from his depression, and to regard it as a problem to be solved rather than as an irremediable personal deficiency. It is also extremely helpful if the patient can regard his negative, hopeless, self-critical thoughts as examples of the curious effects of depression on thinking, rather than as reflections of reality.
Clearly, it is necessary to switch to a problem-oriented conceptualization before the patient is likely to use such coping skills as he has for dealing with depression and the life problems which contribute to it. One reason why most of us do not continue to revolve around the circle I have illustrated is that we deliberately break into it by engaging in coping actions aimed at changing how we feel. One reason why we may not do so is because we do not know what to do. Equally, if we are poor we may not have the resources to cheer ourselves up. However, I suspect that for many depressed patients the reason that they have not engaged in more effective coping behaviour is that the distorting effect of depression on their thinking makes it less likely that they see depression, and the situations producing it, as problems to be solved by the use of coping and other skills. Further, depression will make them more pessimistic about the eventual success of attempts at problem-solving or coping, and therefore they will be less likely to engage in coping or to persist in the face of difficulties or setbacks.
Therapeutic implications
Essentially, treatments should be directed at reversing the factors that facilitate rotation of the circle described. This would involve helping the patient to reconceptualize his depression as a problem to be solved and providing him with the coping skills to modify his mood; to regard his negative thinking as a reflection of the biasing effects of depression rather than as reflections of reality and to train him to test and modify his thinking accordingly; to arrange his environment so that he has less opportunity to ruminate on negative thoughts; and to engage in problem-solving activity so that there are fewer environmental inputs reinforcing negative interpretations and more environmental inputs inconsistent with such interpretations. Cognitive therapy for depression, as developed by Beck, attempts to achieve all these ends. There is encouraging preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of this procedure (Beck-et al. 1979 , Gelder 1983 ). However, it is not at present in a form that is likely to be widely available in a health service which is short of resources. We are currently attempting to simplify and abbreviate cognitive therapy so that it may be more widely used. In the meantime, some of the therapeutic suggestions I have indicated might be incorporated without great cost into the routine management of depressives, particularly those which encourage the patient to distance himself from his depression and to regard it as a problem to be solved rather than as something he should be blamed for but is helpless to change.
